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1. Introduction 
Although there is an ongoing controversy in philosophy of science about so called ceteris 
paribus lawsthat is, roughly, about laws with exceptionsa fundamental question 
about those laws has been neglected (§2). This is due to the fact that this question 
becomes apparent only if two different readings of ceteris paribus clauses in laws have 
been separated. 
The first reading of ceteris paribus clauses, which I will call the epistemic reading, 
covers applications of laws: predictions, for example, might go wrong because we do 
not know all the relevant factors which are causally effective in relevant situation. The 
second reading, which I will call the metaphysical reading, is concerned with the laws 
themselves and their possible exceptions (§3). It is this latter readingand the funda-
mental question associated with itwhich has been neglected due to the confusion of 
the two readings (§4): if we leave epistemic issues aside is there at all conceptual space 
left for a notion of laws of nature which allows the laws themselves to have exceptions? 
I call a law with exceptions in this sense, if such there is, a real ceteris paribus law. 
To tackle this question, I distinguish grounded laws from non-grounded laws (§5). A 
grounded law is, roughly, a law about structured entities where the properties of the 
parts of that structure figure themselves in laws of nature (§6). I will claim that, since 
the substructure of such an entity can be damaged, grounded laws themselves can face 
exceptions. Hence, they are candidates to be real (metaphysical) ceteris paribus laws in 
the sense of my central question. I will discuss grounded laws and their exceptions in 
detail (§7, §8, §9). 
For reasons of space, the further question whether we can even have a notion of fun-
damental (non-grounded) laws that allows for exceptions cannot be discussed here. I 
will, however, give a positive answer and also outline how I have argued for that claim 
elsewhere (§10). 
2. Standard Stories about ceteris paribus Laws 
Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature are so called ceteris pari-
bus laws; laws which hold in certain normal or ideal conditions only and are, hence, not 
strict: 
                                                 
∗  I wish to thank Jeremy Butterfield, Dorothy Edgington, Andreas Kamlah, James Logue, and Barbara 
Stafford for supportive comments on earlier versions and the audience at GAP5 for their helpful 
questions and critique. 
 2
Nancy Cartwright: All laws are ceteris paribus laws. (In Fn.:) I even intend to include most so-
called fundamental laws of physics. (Cartwright 1995: 155) 
Pietroski and Rey: Given current science, the appropriate question would seem to be whether 
any laws are strict. (Pietroski and Rey 1995: 88) 
The notion ceteris paribusliterally all else being equalis usually read in a broad 
sense; namely, that a ceteris paribus law is a law which sometimes has exceptions. I 
adopt this broad reading. It should be mentioned, however, that it would be better to 
speak more generally of proviso laws if we have this broad sense in mind and of ceteris 
paribus only if we really mean that something, circumstances for example, have to be 
equal to a certain standard. Anyway, disregarding these verbal issues my focus will be 
on alleged laws which, in some cases, do not hold good, i.e., on laws for which some 
prima facie falsifications are just a exceptions. 
An example which is often quoted by the proponents of ceteris paribus laws like 
Nancy Cartwright is Newtons law of gravitation. It says that masses m attract other 
masses M at distance r with the gravitational force FG = GmM/r². Lets consider the spe-
cial case of the earth and an arbitrary massive object near its surface, an overhead trans-
parency for example. If we let it drop, will it fall according to the equation for the motion 
derived directly from the law of gravitation? It wont. There can be all sorts of inter-
ferences: air resistance, the blowing of the overhead projectors fan, electromagnetic 
forces due to electrostatic charge of the plastic, etc. So, even the prototype of lawhood
the law of gravitationseems to be a ceteris paribus law: 
The force of size GMm/r2 does not appear to be there; it is not what standard measurements gener-
ally reveal; and the effects we are entitled to expect  principally an acceleration in a system of 
mass m a distance r away of size GM/r2  are not there either. (Cartwright 2002: 428) 
However, this story is confusing and my aim is to attract attention to the fact that there 
are two different ways in which we can interpret the phenomenon that a law is a ceteris 
paribus law, i.e., a law with exceptions. Newtons law of gravitation will, in the light of 
these new readings, be rehabilitated.1 
3. Two Readings of the ceteris paribus Clause 
Reconsider the falling transparency. I said that Newtons law of gravitation
FG = GmMr-2is a ceteris paribus law because, apparently, the transparency does not 
fall according to how the law says it should fall. This, however, was deceitful of me. 
What needs the proviso in this case is obviously not Newtons law but our prediction 
only. Suppose we take other facts and laws on board, laws about air resistance, laws 
                                                 
1  Newtons law of gravitation is, of course, not a law at all. The law statement is false because of 
general relativity. I will use it nonetheless as my example. The reader can exchange it with any law 
statement he or she thinks picks out a real law. 
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about electro-magnetic forces, etc., facts about the charge the transparency is carrying, 
about the distribution of molecules in the air, etc.2 then our prediction would be more 
and more accurate. While taking these laws on board, however, we do not suppose that 
Newtons law has changed (to FG = ½GmM5r, say). Newtons law contributes to the fall-
ing of massive objects always the same force whether there are other forces around or 
not. Hence, it is not Newtons law which is a ceteris paribus law but it is our prediction 
which needs that proviso. The exception was only an apparent exception, not a real one. 
The laws effect was there in its full impact but it had been diluted or masked by other 
laws effects which have also had a say in this particular scenario. 
In short, if someone says a law L is a ceteris paribus law we have to ask whether she 
really means that, in many cases, an event is not entirely covered and hence not describ-
able by just this single law but only by manythis is what I call the epistemic reading
or whether she indeed means that the law itself does not apply in this situationwhich 
is the metaphysical reading. In this paper I want to focus on the latter reading. That is, I 
want to ask the question whether we can have a concept of laws of nature that allows 
the laws themselves (not only our predictions) to have exceptions.3 
4. The Danger to Fail to Differentiate between the Epistemic and the Metaphysical 
Case 
The danger to confuse the metaphysical case with the epistemic one is real. Poincaré, 
for example, comes to the conclusion that the laws themselves are only approximate 
although his example is an instance of a prediction which needs the proviso: 
Take the law of gravitation, which is the least imperfect of all known laws. [] I announce, then, 
with a quasi-certitude that the coordinates of Saturn at such and such hour will be comprised be-
tween such and such limits. Yet is that certainty absolute? Could there not exist in the universe 
some gigantic mass, much greater than that of all the known stars and whose action could make it-
self felt at great distance? That mass might be animated by a colossal velocity [] it might come 
all at once to pass near us. Surely it would produce in our solar system enormous perturbations 
that we have not foreseen. [] For all these reasons, no particular law will ever be more than ap-
proximate and probable. (Poincaré 1958: 130) 
Or reconsider Pietroski and Reys remark: Given current science, the appropriate ques-
tion would seem to be whether any laws are strict. (Pietroski and Rey 1995: 88) Why is 
                                                 
2  Which is a utopian dream. But I take it that at least the following statement is a truism: the more we 
know the better we predict. 
3  Next to my two readings of the ceteris paribus clausethe epistemic vs. the metaphysical reading
there is a second, similar, way to tackle the ceteris paribus issue: dispositionalists, like Nancy 
Cartwright (cf. Cartwright 1983, 1989, 1999) claim to be able to strictify laws like Newtons law of 
gravitation by claiming that they are not about the occurrent behaviour of objects but about their 
dispositions to behave. In Can Capacities rescue us from Ceteris paribus Laws? (Schrenk, 
forthcoming) I have pointed out that this strategy does more harm to an understanding of the ceteris 
paribus issue rather than that it enlightens the subject. 
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this so? Because current science has not yet found the real laws and has only law hy-
potheses which barely say what really happens in the world? Or is it rather because we 
have found the real laws but they are, indeed, ceteris paribus? Or is the confusion of an 
epistemic and an metaphysical issue at work as I am inclined to believe? Then Pietroski 
and Reys remark is caused and motivated by the observation that predictions almost 
always go wrong where they then blame the laws for this failure. Consider a second of 
their remarks:  
We want to say, recall, that the law of gravity holds, other things being equal. But other things are 
not equal when protons and electrons are the bodies in question, since these bodies also have 
charge. (Pietroski and Rey 1995: 105) 
I am inclined to ask which law or relation it is then, if not Newtons law, that holds be-
tween a mass and a force in case there are charges around as well. Again, I suggest that 
it is a prediction which is purely based on Newtons law which goes wrong rather than 
it being the law which faces an exception.4 
Apparently, the confusion between a metaphysical reading of the ceteris paribus 
clause and an epistemic one has led many philosophers to the wrong conclusion that 
laws like the law of gravitation are ceteris paribus laws. Philosophers who implicitly 
favour the epistemic reading of ceteris paribus tell us that all laws (now, wrongly, meta-
physically speaking) are ceteris paribus laws. Generations of philosophers and scien-
tists, however, have unquestionably presupposed that laws of nature, whatever else 
they might be, are at least exceptionless regularities (Lewis 1986: xi).5 The Oxford 
Dictionary of Physics, for example, states that any exceptional event that did not comply 
with the law would require the existing law to be discarded or would have to be de-
scribed as a miracle (OUP 2000: 260). 
No one, however, has questioned this creed and has taken the effort to inquire 
whether real exceptions to laws are conceptually or metaphysically possible. 
5. The Distinction between Grounded Laws and non-grounded Laws 
In order to start this inquiry it is necessary to divide the realm of laws into what I will 
call grounded and non-grounded laws. I will claim that both grounded laws and non-
                                                 
4  My account bears some similarities to Hempels in his (Hempel 1988): Note that a proviso as here 
understood is not a clause that can be attached to a theory as a whole and vouchsafe its deductive 
potency [] Rather, a proviso has to be conceived as a clause that pertains to some particular 
application of a given theory. (Hempel 1988, 26; my italics). Also consider Earman and Roberts 
interpretation of Hempels remark: Hempels provisos are not provisos proper but are simply 
conditions of application of a theory which is intended to state lawlike generalizations that hold 
without qualification. [Provisos] must be attached to applications of a theory rather than to law 
statements. (Earman and Roberts 1999: 444) 
5  That Lewis himself is not quite that strict will be pointed out later. 
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grounded (or fundamental) laws can be laws with exceptionsalthough both in a dif-
ferent way. 
The idea of groundedness is, roughly, that laws might be about complex objects. A 
law Fs are Gs is grounded iff Fs are objects with parts and a substructure such that the 
objects being F and its being G both supervene on the properties and relations of its 
parts and, moreover, the law Fs are Gs supervenes on the laws amongst the properties 
and relations of the parts of the object.6 
If you influence the underlying structure of a particular F you perhaps influence the 
behaviour potential of this object and so you might challenge the validity of the law. I 
take grounded laws to be, in this respect, similar to dispositions with bases. If an object 
loses the basis for a disposition it also loses that disposition. If the ground for the 
grounded law is lost, so is the grounded law. Take laws governing the chemical reaction 
between complex molecules. If you could change the laws of atomic physics and / or 
you could modify the structure of the molecules you would change the laws applicable 
to that molecule. 
A law Fs are Gs is non-grounded, on the other hand, if objects that are F do not have 
a substructure, or, at least, that substructure does not dictate whether the object is F, or 
G, or whether Fs are Gs holds. The fundamental laws of physics are most likely non-
grounded laws in this sense. 
6. Grounded Laws: the Accurate Definition 
My ultimate definition of groundedness comes in three stages:7 (GL1) postulating 
underlying structures, (GL2) securing that the grounded law inherits the law character 
from the laws it is grounded in, and (GL3) making exceptions possible (but not inevita-
ble) due to object internal structure changes.8 
A law L: Fs are Gs is grounded iff: 
(GL1) Postulating underlying structures. 
For each x that is F there are C1Cn such that x is a mereological sum of C1Cn (n = n(x))9. There 
are various properties and relations P1Pm, P1*Ph* such that various Ci, and various composites of 
subsets of {C1Cn} can have those properties and relations P1Pm, P1*Ph* (with m = m(x), 
h = h(x)), e.g. P1(C1), P2(C1 + C3), P3*(C4, C7 + C3). There are laws L1Lk amongst the various Pi 
and Pj*. 
                                                 
6  If the term derived law is more familiar the reader is invited to substitute grounded for derived. 
The reason I have chosen a new word is that I aim to underline the metaphysical aspect of my inquiry. 
7  A health warning: the definition is formal and complex but it is only in this way that some wanted and 
unwanted consequences of grounded laws become apparent (§7, §8). 
8  Just a note in advance: grounded laws are not necessarily laws with exceptions. 
9  I.e., the number of parts varies per x. 
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A grounded law Fs are Gs is a law about complex objects x.10 Note that Fs might be 
multiply realisable such that different xs which are Fs have a different number and a 
different kind of parts. The parts C1Cn need not be atoms; they can have parts them-
selves. 
(GL2) Securing that the grounded law inherits the law character from the laws it is grounded in. 
Consider the following domain D := {the xs; all the parts of the xs}. F, G, and P1Pm11 are defined 
on D, i.e., they are subsets of D, D2, D3,  (It follows from (GL1)s requirement that the Pjs obey 
some laws L1Lk that not all logically possible P1Pm distributions are allowed.) On D, the set of 
properties {F, G} supervenes on the set of all the Pjs {Pj} in the following way: for all x1 and x2 
with parts x1 = C1 +  + Cn(x1) and x2 = C1′ +  + Cn(x2)′: if there is a total match for all Pi be-
tween <C1, , Cn(x1)> and some permutation of <C1′, , Cn(x2)′> then Fx1 ≡ Fx2 and Gx1 ≡ Gx2 and 
(because of the laws amongst the Pj) ∀x (Fx ⊃ Gx).  
(GL2) ensures that the properties F and G supervene on the Pj properties which are 
properties of the parts of objects that are Fs or Gs and en passant that the grounded law 
Fs are Gs supervenes on the laws amongst the Pj. 
So far, however, every loss of G-ness leads immediately to a loss of F-ness. That is 
not a disadvantage per se, but that means that so far our grounded laws are strict as long 
as the subvenient laws do not change. However, I am not asking for the laws which are 
grounding the grounded laws to be strict.12 If the former are not, it is likely that the re-
spective grounded law is not either. Yet, I want it to be possible for grounded laws to be 
ceteris paribus in two ways: one, where the underlying laws have exceptions and, two, 
where the underlying structure breaks down. For a grounded law to be a ceteris paribus 
law in virtue of the objects structure breaking down we have to allow for the possibility 
that an object is not a G while being an F without the underlying laws having changed. 
This possibility opens up when we claim that (GL2) defines only sufficient (but not 
necessary) conditions for things being Fs and Gs. We can claim that there can be other 
sufficient underlying structures for Fs and Gs with other properties P1*Ph* than those 
in (GL2). Pi (of (GL2)) could be, for example, the property of having a certain mass or 
charge or volume whereas Pi* is the property of having a little less or more mass, 
charge, or volume. An F whose parts change in this manner (from being Pi to being Pi*; 
from weighing 5g to weighing 5.5g) could still be an F, yet lose the property G.13 Hence 
point (GL3): 
                                                 
10  Please note that there are, of course, many different ways in which macroscopic objects can be cut 
into pieces but that does not matter for my definition. All I am saying is that if there is a way that 
fulfils (GL1)(GL3) the law Fs are Gs is a grounded law. 
11  Note that I am only talking about the properties P1Pm here and not yet about the other P1*Ph* I 
mentioned in (1). It will become clear in (3) why. 
12  Chemical laws, although they are themselves grounded and bear ceteris paribus clauses ground 
biological laws. 
13  There can, however, be changes amongst the parts of an F which do neither affect its being F, nor its 
being G. 
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(GL3) Making exceptions possible due to internal structural changes. 
Consider, again, the following domain D := {the xs; all the parts of the xs}. F, G, and P1Pm, P1*Pk* 
are defined on D, i.e., they are subsets of D, D2, D3,  On D, the set of properties {F, G} super-
venes on the set of all the Pis and Pj*s {Pj*, Pi} in the following way: for all x1 and x2 with parts 
x1 = C1 +  + Cn(x1) and x2 = C1′ +  + Cn(x2)′: if there is a total match for all Pi, Pj* between 
<C1, , Cn(x1)> and some permutation of <C1′, , Cn(x2)′> then Fx1 ≡ Fx2 and Gx1 ≡ Gx2 and yet 
(note the difference to (GL2) making exceptions possible:) ¬∀x (Fx ⊃ Gx) (which is not to say 
that ¬∃x (Fx ∧ Gx)). 
7. An Example Grounded Law 
Let me give an example of a grounded law to exemplify (GL1)(GL3). The law I want 
to consider stems from biochemistry. To supply their cells with a continuous and ade-
quate flow of oxygen vertebrates use two oxygen-carrying molecules: the proteins hae-
moglobin and myoglobin. Haemoglobin carries oxygen in blood, myoglobin facilitates 
the transport of oxygen in muscles. I focus on haemoglobin which shall be the main 
actor in the following example of a grounded law: oxygen (O2) combines with haemo-
globin (Hb) to form oxyhaemoglobin (HbO2): O2 + Hb → HbO2. 
What corresponds to F, G, and the various Ps in my definition of a grounded law 
now? Everything in front of the arrow corresponds to F, everything behind to G. That 
means particularly that F does not have to refer to a single object. An F can well be the 
complex body formed by the two molecules Hb and O2 in a close enough spatial rela-
tion (if liquids, energy, movement, pressure, etc. are needed to kick off the reaction then 
F also refers to them). Since Fs are chopped up into parts C1Cn anyway, this move is of 
no great significance. G corresponds to HbO2 but if there are any by-products next to 
HbO2 G refers also to those by-products. 
I should confess at this point that it might be necessary to reformulate the definition of 
a grounded law by replacing Fs are Gs by if there is an F there is a G (or ∀x (Fx ⊃ Gx) 
by ∀x (Fx ⊃ ∃y(Gy))) and making the relevant adjustments in the rest of the definition. 
This is because the object which acquires the property G due to the law might not be 
identical to the object which is F. Likewise, a time variable might have to be incor-
porated for grounded laws which govern causal processes in time. It is also possible (or 
necessary) to talk about events rather than objects as suggested by my formulations so 
far. Those events would then include not only the main actors (that is the objects the xs 
in the definition seemed first to range over) but the whole space-time region and its 
properties where these objects are located.14 
Here are some parts C1Cn and some of their properties and relations P1Pm, P1*Ph* 
towards each other: from biochemistry textbooks we learn that the capacity of [] 
haemoglobin to bind oxygen depends on the presence of a nonpolypeptide unit, namely, 
a heme group. [] The heme consists of an organic part and an iron atom. (Stryer 
                                                 
14  Hence, such an F event might be an object F1 bumping into an object F2 with such and such impulse 
surrounded by oxygen and G might be the event of an explosion. 
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1988: 144) In more detail, the heme group is a complex web of various carbohydrate 
chains and nets. In the middle sits, surrounded by four nitrogen atoms, the iron atom. 
Next to the internal bonds to the nitrogen the iron can form the crucial loose association 
with oxygen.15 Needless to say, the huge rest of the molecule has also a say in the 
character of this O2 binding. There are four heme groups in total in each Hb molecule 
such that four O2 molecules can be bound in total. In fact, the Hb molecule has the ex-
citing feature to bind additional O2 better the more O2 has been bound already.  
So far, I have only explicitly mentioned properties and relations P1Pm, P1*Ph* 
amongst the parts but no laws. The relevant ones are, for example, the chemical or 
physical laws governing the bonding between O2 and Fe and the rest of the molecules 
subparts. Quantum mechanical laws tell us about these bondings. Therefore, I claim that 
the abstract (GL1) and (GL2) of my definition of grounded laws have found their real 
life counterparts. How about (GL3)? In order to make (GL3) plausible it is valuable to 
note that the discovery of mutant haemoglobins has revealed that diseases can arise 
from a change of a single amino acid in a protein. The concept of molecular disease [] 
came from studies of the abnormal haemoglobin causing sickle-cell anemia. (Stryer 
1988: 143144) An easier example for the structural change I need for definition item 
(GL3) is, however, yet another derivative of the normal haemoglobin A: in haemoglo-
bin M a  
defective subunit cannot bind oxygen because of a structural change near the heme that directly 
affects oxygen binding. [] Substitution of tyrosine for the proximal histidine results in the for-
mation of a haemoglobin M. The negatively charged oxygen atom of tyrosine is coordinated to the 
iron atom, which is in the ferric state. Water rather than O2 is bound at the sixth coordination po-
sition. (Stryer 1988: 170; the second part of this quote is to be found in the margin of the page as 
subtitle to figure 754)  
Hence, we have an example of a haemoglobin (Hb) realiser (i.e., haemoglobin M) which 
does not combine with oxygen (O2) to oxyhaemoglobin (HbO2) (translated into (GL3): 
haemoglobin M is realised by the Pj* properties which lead to ¬∀x (Fx ⊃ Gx)). The 
grounded law has a real, not only an apparent, exception. The laws effect, Hb binding 
O2 is not just covered haemoglobin M really does not bind O2. 
8. Grounded Laws: Challenges 
There are challenges to the idea of grounded laws. In fact, it might be a matter of taste 
whether we accept them as laws or not. I want to discuss three problems:  
(i) Are grounded laws laws? I will give three answers: Answer 1: lie down with the 
dogs get up with fleas. Grounded laws inherit their law character from the underlying 
laws. This answer is backed up by the fact that there could, in principle, be strict 
                                                 
15  Each haemoglobin molecule contains 4 polypeptide chains, and each chain is folded around an iron-
containing group called heme. It is actually the iron that forms a loose association with oxygene. 
(Mader 1993: 614) 
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grounded laws. If Fs refer to all and only structures like in (GL2) the grounded law is 
nearly safe from exceptions. Nearly, not totally, because the underlying laws could be 
laws with exceptions. But let us assume we have strict underlying laws then, because of 
the supervenience relations defined, the grounded law is strict. Every non-G event is a 
non-F event such that no exception is possible. This is why grounded laws can indeed 
get very close in character to those fundamental laws we intuitively think of when we 
think of the prototypes of lawhood. When Fs are realised by (GL2) structures the 
grounded law even inherits necessity from its pedigree laws (if we believe in nomologi-
cal necessity). For the same reason grounded laws also support counterfactuals. 
Answer 2 is an argument from scientific practice: chemistry, biology etc. are full of 
regularities as described in grounded laws (cf. haemoglobin). Grounded laws are the 
relevant law candidates for those sciences.  
Answer 3 is a negative answer: grounded laws arent laws. Only the fundamental 
laws are laws. If this is so, the answer to my core question whether there are real ceteris 
paribus laws at all (in the metaphysical reading) depends on the fundamental laws (non-
grounded laws) alone. 
By the way, that the so called fundamental laws of physics are non-grounded does 
not mean per sein my definitionthat they ground the laws of, say, chemistry. How-
ever, the notion of a fundamental law can be analysed in terms of groundedness and 
non-groundedness. Thereby a double meaning of fundamental is revealed: a law L is 
fundamental iff it is non-grounded and grounding. However, it is very hard to think of a 
non-grounded law that is not grounding any grounded law (but just exists for itself). 
This is probably why the double meaning of fundamental has not yet been revealed.16 
(ii) What if most Fs are realised by (GL3) structures which do not secure the occur-
rence of Gs? Is it then still justified to call the grounded law a law? There is, indeed, no 
statistical normalcy claim in my definition of grounded laws and a grounded law with 
only negative instances has little predictive and explanatory value. Remember, however, 
that I aim to give a pure metaphysical description of what could possibly be a law with 
real exceptions. That those laws (or many of them) are useless for epistemic subjects is 
not a welcome feature for us but, on the other hand, not a conclusive argument against 
them. Epistemic subjects will be keen on those grounded laws which are relatively often 
and relatively stably realised by (GL2) structures. But the grouping into good and bad 
laws is just superimposed on the total class of grounded laws and does not endanger the 
metaphysical core. 
More, however, can be said about the character of the epistemically advantageous 
grounded laws. I think that those laws involve natural kinds. If we go with Putnam and 
Kripke natural kinds have certain properties essentially. Amongst those properties are 
structural properties which figure in underlying laws. In short, if Fs, in grounded laws, 
are complex objects including natural kinds as parts then Fs will have some (GL2)-like 
structures essentially and hence the strict success of the grounded law is guaranteed. If, 
                                                 
16  This is also the reason for which I allow myself to use fundamental and non-grounded synonymously 
when no confusion can result. 
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on top of that, we can argue plausibly that it is not us dividing nature into parts as it 
suits us but that we carve nature at its joints such that natural kinds are a genuine meta-
physical category (and not human made epistemic entities) then we have even estab-
lished a sorting mechanism on the class of grounded laws which is based on metaphysics: 
the good ones involve natural kinds, the bad ones do not.17 
(iii) But worse is to come. In (GL3) I have demanded if there is a total match for all 
Pi, Pj* between <C1, , Cn(x1)> and some permutation of <C1′, , Cn(x2)′> then Fx1 ≡ Fx2 
and Gx1 ≡ Gx2 and yet ¬∀x (Fx ⊃ Gx) (which is not to say that ¬∃x (Fx ∧ Gx)). But 
what if, with the help of the Pi* properties and the (grounding) laws amongst them, it is 
actually the case that for (GL3) realised Fs that ∀x (Fx ⊃ ¬Gx)? Then we can swap the 
roles of the Pjs and the Pj*s and get the second grounded law Fs are non-Gs. Hence, 
both Fs are Gs and Fs are non-Gs would come out as grounded laws. As ceteris paribus 
laws, to be sure, but as laws. 
We could cure this disease of grounded laws by changing  and yet ¬∀x (Fx ⊃ Gx) 
(which is not to say that ¬∃x (Fx ∧ Gx)) to ∃x (Fx ∧ Gx)) and ∃x (Fx ∧ ¬Gx) such 
that the Pj* properties neither secure ∀x (Fx ⊃ Gx) nor ∀x (Fx ⊃ ¬Gx). But that is un-
realistic for the following reason. A real exception to a grounded law is not a miraculous 
event which just so happens. An exception has a cause which is well grounded in the 
fundamental laws the world is governed by. Hence, we have another bullet to bite if we 
want to defend grounded laws: unless Fs refer exclusively to (GL2) structures there is 
the possibility that next to every grounded law Fs are Gs there is also the opposite one: 
Fs are non-Gs. But that surely contradicts our intuitions about lawhood.18 Again, it is 
only positively high statistics of F realisations in favour of G which could somehow 
rescue the initial law to be a law.19 
9. Grounded Laws: Evaluation 
But, in the end, how much damage can all this do to an inquiry whether there could be 
laws with exceptions? Not too much I hope. Even if the concept of a grounded law has 
                                                 
17  Lewis writes on that issue: Fundamental laws, those that the ideal system takes as axiomatic, must 
concern perfectly natural properties. Derived laws that follow fairly straightforwardly also will tend to 
concern fairly natural properties. Regularities concerning unnatural properties may indeed be strictly 
implied, and should count as derived laws if so. (Lewis 1999: 42) 
18  I was pleased to see that Schurz comes to a similar conclusion about ceteris paribus laws while 
arguing in a completely different way to mine: cf. (Schurz 2001: 367) 
19  A final note on this matter: in the same way a crude property nominalism could suffer from an 
implausible abundance of properties my account of grounded laws could lead to an overpopulation of 
laws: take any event you like and baptise it with the kind name F. Everything else like that shall 
qualify as F as well (this is meant to be a Putnam / Kripke style paradigm case baptising, a reference 
to an archetypal F). Wait a second and see what happens next. Call the next event G (and everything 
else like it: again Putnam / Kripke at work). Additionally presuppose a minimal determinism. Voilá, a 
grounded law: ∀x (Fx ⊃ Gx). (And maybe even a strict one depending on how narrow or fine grained 
Fs and Gs are defined by this paradigm reference fixing business.)  
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also a strong epistemic character to itbecause it is likely that it is us choosing the 
concepts figuring in the law statements of grounded lawsthe exceptions a grounded 
law can have can still be of the real character I was looking for: the grounded laws ef-
fect might be missing not only because it is masked or diluted for epistemic subjects but 
because it is just not there. And this is how I defined a proper metaphysical exception.  
The two extreme cases are thus: (i) we do not accept grounded laws as laws at all. 
They have rather the character of handy rules. And yet, the exception to such a rule 
would be a genuine exception. (ii) We do count them as laws, although the concept of a 
grounded law is very much impregnated with questions of how to map higher level con-
cepts to lower level concepts as highlighted above. In that case we have a very good 
candidate for laws with real, metaphysical exceptions. 
My final answer is, hence, conditional: if grounded laws qualify as laws at all they 
are good candidates for being real ceteris paribus laws in the metaphysical reading; if 
they do not the question is handed over to non-grounded laws. 
10. Non-Grounded Laws: an Outline 
There is no space left for a full analysis of our concepts of fundamental or non-
grounded laws in order to answer the question whether exceptions to those laws can be 
allowed. I think they can but here I can only present a very sketchy argument for my 
belief. I will first give a general, metaphorical argument why I think that a concept of 
exception ridden fundamental laws are possible. Afterwards, I outline how that idea can 
be incorporated into one of the orthodox theories of lawhood, namely the Ramsey-
Lewis view.20 
One of the initial ideas to distinguish laws from accidents was to claim that law 
statementsas opposed to sentences that state pure accidentsare true universal state-
ments whose predicates refer to scientifically kosher properties. This assumption did not 
succeed for of the two following syntactically and semantically alike statements (both 
contain only scientifically respectable predicates and both are universal quantifications) 
the first is a good candidate for a law, the second is not: 
1.  All solid spheres of enriched uranium (U235) have a diameter of less than one mile. 
2.  All solid spheres of gold (Au) have a diameter of less than one mile. 
Philosophers have concluded that in order to distinguish laws from accidental generali-
sations a law must be a generalisation plus some X. Many Xs have been suggested: by 
                                                 
20  In short: Laws are consequences of those propositions which we should take as axioms if we knew 
everything and organized it as simply as possible in a deductive system. [] A contingent generali-
zation is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive 
systems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength. A generalisation is a law at a 
world i, likewise, if and only if it appears as a theorem in each of the best deductive systems true at i. 
(Lewis 1973: 73) 
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anti-Humeans, for example, natural necessity which is a relation between the universals 
the generalisations scientific predicates refer to,21 or, by Humeans, the membership in 
the best deductive system which describes the worlds history in the simplest and also 
strongest way.22 
My general idea for the possibility of fundamental laws with exceptions is now this: 
if we happen to live in a suitably messy world, then already approximate generalisa-
tions plus X are sufficient for lawhood. The hope is that we have overpaid the bill with 
the X additional to generality such that we can demand cash back which comes in the 
currency of exceptions. Of the two Xs from above the Humeans X (here: David Lewis 
X), namely membership in the best deductive system, will turn out to be well suited for 
the task. Only a minor change to Lewis theory makes his X so rich that it can pay for 
the exceptions. However, there is no space to give a detailed argument for this claim 
and I can only make it plausible by quoting a passage from Lewis:  
A localized violation is not the most serious sort of difference of law. The violated deterministic 
law has presumably not been replaced by a contrary law. Indeed, a version of the violated law, 
complicated and weakened by a clause to permit the one exception, may still be simple and strong 
enough to survive as a law. (Lewis 1973: 75) 
All depends on how extended the violation is: if it is temporally and spatially limited, 
i.e., a small, localized, inconspicuous miracle (Lewis 1973: 75) then it is easy to 
imagine that the loss of simplicity and strength (Lewis X) we have to accept when we 
amend the antecedents of those laws still does not affect the robustly best position of the 
best system. 
11. Summary 
I have started this paper by pointing out that many people not only think that most laws 
are ceteris paribus laws but also that there are ceteris paribus laws all the way down to 
fundamental physics. Although this might be true proponents of ceteris paribus laws 
have drawn that conclusion on wrong assumptions. I have, hopefully, made plausible 
the idea that there are two different readings of law statements with ceteris paribus 
clauses: a metaphysical vs. an epistemic reading. Both cases have been mixed up and it 
is this confusion which led to the verdict that there are laws with exceptions even in 
fundamental realms. Once freed from epistemic considerations, it is, however, still a 
metaphysical question which seeks an answer whether we can have a concept of laws 
which allows them to have exceptions. Having turned to this metaphysical reading of 
the ceteris paribus issue entirely (and thereby having turned to the main question of my 
article), I have divided laws into two kindsgrounded laws vs. non-grounded laws. I 
have examined grounded laws in detail and I have drawn a conditional conclusion: if 
                                                 
21  Cf., for example, (Armstrong 1983) and (Armstrong 1997). 
22  Cf., for example, (Lewis 1973). 
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grounded laws qualify at all as laws they are candidates for laws with real exceptions. 
Exceptions to fundamental laws are also possible: at the end of this paper I have briefly 
outlined how we could formulate a concept of fundamental laws of nature which allows 
them to tolerate at least small, localized, and inconspicuous violations. Whether there 
are such laws remains, however, an empirical issue. 
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